Post #74 - by Fred Bates - October 20, 2022
This post is meant to be read in conjunction with Post #73, the backstory to my lawsuits
Introduction
In post #73 on September 2, 2022, I provided the backstory to my three federal lawsuits against the City of San Jose. In today's post I will discuss the misconduct of San Jose city officials and officials with the US District Court and the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals during litigation of my lawsuits. Much of the focus will be on my first lawsuit against the City and three former police officials, Chief of Police Rob Davis, Deputy Chief of Police Adonna Amoroso, and Captain Tuck Younis. It was during the litigation of my first lawsuit filed in 2006 that many criminal acts by San Jose city officials and officials with the US District Court in San Jose and the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals occurred relating to public corruption. In my backstory, I explained that my lawsuits resulted from the denial of my CCW privileges after I retired from the San Jose Police Department on a medical disability in April 2004. I explained that the denial of my CCW privileges was racist, punitive and retaliatory, and was done with the specific intent to cause me financial harm, humiliate and demean me, and to cause me emotional distress. The doctor that provided the work restriction that is at the heart of the denial of my CCW privileges stated that "they know better than that, they are messing with you!" I explained that San Jose city officials were given several opportunities to change the initial decision to deny me a CCW permit but refused to do so, knowing that they were violating California state law and City policies. The denial had very little to do with the CCW permit itself, but more to do with City officials holding a grudge against me, and their willingness to engage in serious misconduct to settle that grudge.
My First Federal Lawsuit Against the City of San Jose, Chief of Police Rob Davis, Deputy Chief of Police Adonna Amoroso, and Captain Tuck Younis
As noted in the backstory, my first lawsuit was a Section 1983 claim (often referred to as a Monell claim) against the City of San Jose, Chief of Police Rob Davis, Deputy Chief of Police Adonna Amoroso, and Captain Tuck Younis. It was filed as a Section 1983 claim because Davis, Amoroso, and Younis violated my civil rights while acting under color of authority. The cause of action for my complaint/lawsuit for monetary damages is simple and straightforward. My CCW privileges were initially denied by Amoroso in April 2004, without a hearing that is required by California Penal Code Section 12027.1. Amoroso said my work restriction of 'preclusion from psycho-emotional stress,' provided to help control my high blood pressure, meant I retired on a psychological disability. She refused to change her decision when I requested an appeal. In August 2004, after Amoroso retired, I contacted Younis and asked that the police department reconsider Amoroso's decision to deny me a CCW permit. The physician that provided my work restriction sent a letter to Younis stating that my work restriction should not preclude me from carrying a concealed weapon. With this information and the knowledge that my work restriction did not mean I had a psychological disability, Younis denied my CCW permit two more times in September 2004 without the hearing required by Section 12027.1. In October 2004, Chief of Police Rob Davis and San Jose City Attorney Richard Doyle were given opportunities to reverse the decisions of Amoroso and Younis to deny me authorization to carry a concealed weapon. They both failed to do so without providing me a hearing just as Amoroso and Younis. The thing to remember throughout the discussions below is that these officials all denied me a CCW permit without a hearing that is required by Section 12027.1 of California's Penal Code. The hearing requirement of Section 12027.1 is a constitutionally protected interest.
The City's answer to my lawsuit or complaint for damages
The City's answer to my lawsuit or complaint for damages is significant. In its answer, the City admitted that Deputy Chief Amoroso denied me a CCW permit without a hearing. But most importantly, the City admitted that Captain Tuck Younis denied me a CCW permit without a hearing on two separate occasions after he had received the letter from the doctor stating that my work restriction to avoid psycho-emotional stress did not mean I had a psychological disability, and that I should not be precluded from carrying a concealed weapon. This is perhaps the most compelling evidence that City officials violated my civil rights, particularly as it pertains to Younis and Chief of Police Davis. Davis denied me a CCW permit several weeks after Younis after he too had received a copy of the letter from the doctor explaining my work restriction. California Penal Code Section 12027.1 is unambiguous in its hearing requirement for retiring officers whose CCW permits are denied or revoked for other than a psychological disability. Therefore, the case that Younis and Davis violated my civil rights is airtight and cannot be disputed with any credibility. San Jose city officials were well aware of this fact, and it was a driving force behind their misconduct.
The City filed a motion for summary judgment that was facilitated by a fraudulent stipulation of dismissal of defendant Tuck Younis and a false declaration by Younis
Rather than doing the morally correct thing by settling this lawsuit, San Jose city officials conspired with my attorney, officials with the US District Court, and the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals to obstruct justice by trying to rewrite history by covering up the actions of Younis and Davis. This cover-up included fraud by San Jose city officials and my attorney, bias by the courts, and the refusal of the court to follow the Constitution, mandatory statutory law, and precedent. The City's motion for summary judgment was filed in August 2007. It was an unconscionable scheme to perpetrate fraud on the court. The summary judgment motion put forth the false narrative that I was denied a CCW permit only one time by Amoroso in April 2004 and that Younis reversed Amoroso's decision in August 2004 immediately upon receiving the letter from the doctor explaining that I was a suitable candidate to carry a concealed weapon. As has been clearly established in the backstory to my lawsuits and the discussions above, this assertion is a bold face lie. This assertion contradicts what the City specifically admitted was true in its answer to my lawsuit, that Younis had denied my CCW permit in September 2004. As noted above, City officials knew that the actions of Younis and Davis violated my constitutional rights. It was imperative that they put forth the lie that Younis reversed Amoroso's decision in August 2004 after he received the letter from the doctor proving that I was entitled to a CCW permit, in order to prevail on their motion for summary judgment. They argued that Amoroso was entitled to qualified immunity because her decision to deny me a CCW permit was an honest mistake. They argued that Amoroso was confused about my work restriction because she did not have authority to read my medical records. This claim was debunked in the backstory. It's an outright lie. Nevertheless, City officials could not make the same claim that Younis and Davis were confused about my work restriction because of the letter they received from the doctor explaining that I did not have a psychological disability. Rather than settling my lawsuit, City officials chose to file its summary judgment motion with the false claim that I was denied a CCW permit only one time by Amoroso and that Younis reversed Amoroso's decision and granted me a CCW permit in August 2004.
What is so egregious about the City's fraudulent motion for summary judgment is that it appeared to have been encouraged by the US District Court during the Settlement Conference hearing that was held in the early part of 2007. Magistrate Judge Patricia V. Trumbull presided over that hearing. What is unmistakable is that the City had help from my attorney, Stuart Kirchick, in perpetrating fraud on the court with its summary judgment motion, because he agreed to go along with the lies being put forth by the City. The City had two huge obstacles to overcome in order to file their motion for summary judgment pushing the false narrative that I was only denied a CCW permit one time. The obstacles were their admission in their answer that Younis denied my CCW permit in September 2004, and the indisputable evidence that Davis had denied me a CCW permit in October 2004. As I have noted several times, both denials by Younis and Davis occurred without a hearing that is mandated by law, after both had received the letter from the doctor making it clear I was entitled to a CCW permit or the hearing required by law. To overcome these obstacles, the City through its attorney, Michael Dodson, conspired with my attorney to file a stipulation of dismissal of Tuck Younis from my lawsuit without my knowledge or authorization. They then falsely stated that I had agreed to the stipulation. In turn, City officials urged Younis to file a declaration in support of the City's motion for summary judgment falsely stating under oath that Chief of Police Rob Davis played no role whatsoever in the denial and later granting of my CCW permit. The crimes committed here by these officials are conspiracy, obstruction of justice, subornation of perjury and perjury, and bribery; because there is compelling evidence that my attorney (Stuart Kirchick) and Younis were paid off (quid pro quo) for their participation in this scheme. Additionally, their actions were done with the specific intent to perpetrate fraud on the court. Fraud on the court occurs when attorneys, who are officers of the court, perpetrate fraud in order that the judicial machinery cannot perform in the usual manner its impartial task of adjudging cases presented for adjudication. As you will see, this is precisely what happened in this case. The fraudulent stipulation of dismissal of Younis and the false claim of Younis in his declaration about the role of Davis caused irreparable harm to my case because my causes of action against Younis and Davis were never presented to the court for adjudication.
The hearing on the City's motion for summary judgment
During the hearing on the City's summary judgment motion in front of district court judge Ronald M. Whyte, the City put forth the same false narrative as stated in its motion papers. That false narrative was the claim that my CCW permit was denied only one time by Amoroso, and that Younis reversed Amoroso's decision immediately upon receiving the letter from the doctor stating I should not be precluded from carrying a concealed weapon. The fact that my attorney did not push back on this ridiculous claim is evidence he was involved in the City's scheme to perpetrate fraud on the court. A significant development in the hearing was the City's admission that the letter Younis received from the doctor made it "crystal clear" I did not retire on a psychological disability because of my work restriction. This is the smoking gun evidence that Younis and Davis knowingly violated my constitutionally protected rights when they denied me a CCW permit without the due process hearing mandated by Section 12027.1. As noted above, the only exception to the hearing requirement under Section 12027.1 is a psychological disability. Another significant development in the hearing that undermines the City's false narrative that Younis reversed Amoroso's decision in August 2004 is the City's truthful assertion that I was without my CCW permit for eight months. This conflicts with the false narrative in earlier claims by the City that I received my CCW permit in August 2004, four months after Amoroso denied it in April 2004. This Freudian slip by the City was not lost on Judge Whyte. He questioned the City on the apparent discrepancy between the City's prior claims that I received my CCW permit in August 2004, which is four months after it was initially denied in April 2004, and the claim the City was making in the hearing that I was without my CCW permit for eight months. Judge Whyte said he thought it was four months. He asked the City's attorney and my attorney to confirm that it was eight months that I was without my CCW permit. They both confirmed that it was eight months. This is clear evidence that the City's false claim in its motion papers and earlier claims that I received my CCW permit four months after it was initially denied were a blatant fraud on the court in order to cover up the actions of Younis and Davis that violated my constitutional rights. In his ruling on the City's summary judgment motion, Judge Whyte did not address the fraud he uncovered by the City and the complicity of my attorney. Rather, he dismissed my lawsuit by granting the City its motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity for Amoroso and collateral estoppel as to the City based on a small claims court judgment the City won against me. The issue of collateral estoppel will play a significant role in subsequent litigation because it was misapplied by Judge Whyte. The blatant disregard for the fraud perpetrated by the City and the misapplication of the collateral estoppel doctrine by Judge Whyte is evidence of his bias in favor of the City.
My appeal of Judge Whyte's ruling to the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals
I appealed Judge Whyte's dismissal of my lawsuit against the City. The hearing on my appeal was held in December 2009. At the time of the hearing, I was still being represented by attorney Stuart Kirchick. The City again resorted to its scheme to perpetrate fraud on the court. In its answering brief, the City made the same claim that it had made in its motion for summary judgment; the claim that I received my CCW permit from Younis in August 2004, four months after I was denied it by Amoroso in April 2004. The City put forth this same false claim during the hearing on my appeal. It contradicts the truthful claim made by the City and my attorney to Judge Whyte during the hearing in district court that it was eight months that I was without my CCW permit. During the hearing on my appeal, it became apparent that the court was biased against me. One of the judges on the three-judge panel, William Fletcher, asked why I was making this a federal case. He asked why I didn't just drop my case after the small claims proceeding. Clearly, he had bought into the City's fraudulent claim that I had been denied a CCW permit only one time. He stated that I was denied a permit the first time I asked but received it the second time and that it happened "very quickly." This shows that the City's scheme to perpetrate fraud on the court by completely eliminating the actions of Younis and Davis from the scrutiny of the courts worked as intended. Judge Fletcher did, however, express an opinion that undermines the City's defense of collateral estoppel. The City's defense of collateral estoppel, as noted above, is based on a judgment it won against me in a small claims action I filed. However, certain requirements must be met for collateral estoppel to apply. Collateral estoppel is often referred to as issue preclusion. Judge Fletcher stated that he was "dubious about collateral estoppel" because an issue must have been "actually litigated" before collateral estoppel can apply. No evidence was ever presented to the courts or discussed in court proceedings related to my lawsuit that shows any litigation occurred in the small claims case. Another requirement for collateral estoppel is that there has to be a record that "pinpoint" what was litigated and decided in a prior proceeding. Judge Fletcher also established that there was no record or transcript from the Small Claims Court to rely upon for collateral estoppel. Collateral estoppel never was and never will be a viable defense for the City because there are several other compelling reasons that renders it inapplicable, in addition to the reasons discussed above. Also noteworthy is that Judge Fletcher said my lawsuit meets the requirement for a Monell claim. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the district court granting the City's motion for summary judgment despite the blatant fraud of the City, and the clear misapplication of the collateral estoppel doctrine by the district court. The bias and corruption of the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals is breathtaking!
My efforts to have the courts set aside the judgment in my first lawsuit by letters and motions
After my appeal discussed above, I ended my relationship with attorney Stuart Kirchick and began representing myself (pro se) because it was clear he had sold out my interests to the City. Beginning in February 2010, I made several attempts through motions and letters to have the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals vacate or set aside its judgment affirming the district court's order granting the City's summary judgment motion that resulted in the dismissal of my first federal lawsuit. My motions and letters centered mostly on the fraud perpetrated by the City in its summary judgment motion, and on the courts' misapplication of the collateral estoppel doctrine. The Court of Appeals refused to take any actions on my motions and letters by entering summary dispositions that violates the Constitution and precedent, or they just ignored my filings.
My Rule 60 motion for relief from the judgment of Judge Whyte granting the City's motion for summary judgment
With no success in getting relief from the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals with my motions and letters, I filed a Rule 60 motion in US District Court for relief from the judgment granting the City's motion for summary judgment. My Rule 60 motion was filed on February 21, 2013. Rule 60 motions falls under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP). The grounds for my Rule 60 motion were based on the same issues I raised in the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals with my letters and motions to vacate judgment. The first ground for my motion was on the issue of collateral estoppel. I argued that the small claims judgment that was relied upon by the City and courts was constitutionally infirm because there was no litigation. Therefore, it is a void judgment. The second ground for relief was that I was deprived of an impartial and disinterested tribunal during the hearing on the City's motion for summary judgment. The third and final ground for my motion was fraud on the court. One of my fraud arguments was based on the City's false claim that Amoroso's decision to deny me a CCW permit was reversed four months later by Younis. Another fraud claim was based on the fraudulent stipulation of dismissal of Younis from my lawsuit. My final fraud argument was the false claim by Younis in his declaration that Davis played no role in the decision-making regarding my CCW permit.
During the filing of my Rule 60 motion, district court personnel committed fraud by misrepresenting several times in docket entries that my motion was in regard to "Costs Taxed," suggesting that I was challenging the courts costs that were awarded to the City. As noted above, the grounds for my motion were the misapplication of collateral estoppel by the courts, the court's bias, and the false claims by the City in its summary judgment motion. These incorrect entries were intentional and were done in order to set up a phony hearing on my Rule 60 motion. To further facilitate the phony hearing, I was told on two separate occasions by court clerk Cita Escolano that there would be no hearing on my motion. I was also told that my motion would be decided on the papers. The hearing on my motion, misstated as regarding "Cost Taxed," was held on April 26, 2013 without my knowledge. Judge Ronald M. Whyte, who presided over the City's motion for summary judgment, conducted the hearing on my Rule 60 motion. Attorney Richard North represented the City. According to the transcript of the hearing by court reporter Lee-Anne Shortridge, there was a dispositive ruling on my Rule 60 motion made during the hearing. The dispositive ruling was the result of a motion to dismiss by the City that was granted by Judge Whyte, due to my failure to appear. No word for word account of the motion appears in the transcript, thus casting doubt on the legitimacy of the hearing. Also casting doubt on the legitimacy of the hearing is that the civil minutes account of the hearing by court clerk Jackie Garcia contradicts the transcript. The civil minutes does not indicate a dispositive ruling being made in the hearing. Rather, the civil minutes indicate that the court took the matter under submission and that it would enter a ruling at a later time. A written order purported to be by Judge Whyte was filed after the hearing on the same day of the hearing. The hearing on my Rule 60 has no credibility whatsoever, and it appears to have been completely staged. Even though my Rule 60 motion was 23 pages long, supported by approximately 26 exhibits that proved my claims were meritorious, the court's written ruling in its entirety only states that my motion was denied because it was untimely and that I failed to present adequate evidence supporting either of my theories for relief. The ruling is a farce and devoid of reality because Rule 60 motions based on a void judgment and a judgment produced by fraud on the court are not timed barred. For the court to issue such a brief ruling essentially one sentence long on a motion alleging fraud on the court, bias by the court, and a misapplication of the law is indefensible.
The appeal of the order of Judge Whyte denying my Rule 60 motion for relief from his order granting the City's motion for summary judgment
I appealed Judge Whyte's order denying my Rule 60 motion to the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals on July 10, 2013. On September 25, 2014, prior to the court taking any action on my appeal, I filed a motion to vacate the judgment of the district court on the grounds that it was tainted by fraud and was, therefore, a void judgment. There was no way possible for me to have a fair hearing on my appeal based on the fraud surrounding my Rule 60 motion and the bias of Judge Whyte. Despite the clear and convincing evidence of fraud and bias against me by the district court, the 9th Circuit denied my motion to vacate and affirmed Judge Whyte's ruling on the same date, July 31, 2015, without conducting a hearing. In August 2015, I filed a petition for panel rehearing that was denied.
My Rule 60 motion for relief from the stipulation of dismissal of defendant Younis from my lawsuit
As I discussed above, the City's motion for summary judgment in my lawsuit was facilitated by a fraudulent stipulation of dismissal of defendant Tuck Younis. The stipulation of dismissal was based on fraud because it was filed without my knowledge or authorization. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 41 provides that a stipulation of dismissal can only be made with the consent of the plaintiff in a lawsuit. Case law states that a stipulation of dismissal is the absolute right of the plaintiff. A plaintiff's attorney cannot take that right away from a plaintiff as my attorney did, particularly when the stipulation of dismissal harms or destroys a plaintiff's cause of action. This is precisely what happened in my case. As I explained above, the stipulation of dismissal of defendant Younis was absolutely necessary for the City to prevail on its summary judgment motion because the City had already admitted in its answer to my lawsuit that Younis had denied me a CCW permit, without the hearing mandated by law, after he received the letter from the doctor explaining that my work restriction to avoid psycho-emotion stress did not prevent me from carrying a concealed weapon. The hearing requirement implicates a constitutionally protected interest. The stipulation of dismissal of Younis was entered between my attorney and the attorney for the City in order to prevent the district court from ruling on the actions of Younis that violated my constitutional rights. A stipulation of dismissal does not require approval from the court. After Younis was dismissed from my lawsuit, as already discussed above, he committed perjury in a declaration falsely stating that defendant Davis played no role in the decision-making regarding my request for a CCW permit. The stipulation of dismissal effectively destroyed my causes of action as to Younis and Davis, thereby, depriving me of due process. The stipulation of dismissal was filed by my attorney and the City's attorney with the specific intent of perpetrating fraud on the court and obstructing justice, a criminal offense. My motion for relief from the stipulation of dismissal of Younis was filed on September 16, 2013. It was denied by Judge Whyte just as he denied all of my other requests for relief in this matter. It is clear that Judge Whyte had a deep-seated bias against me that renders his judgments to be null and void.
My Second Federal Lawsuit Against the City of San Jose and the San Jose City Council
I filed my second lawsuit/complaint for damages on December 14, 2015. The basis of my lawsuit was that Mayor Sam Liccardo and the City Council, acting under color of law, refused to investigate my discrimination and criminal misconduct complaints against City Attorney Richard Doyle and the San Jose City Attorney's Office in violation of the City's discrimination and harassment policy and Code of Ethics. By refusing to investigate my complaint as is required by City policy, the Mayor and City Council discriminated against me because of my job-related disability and medical condition that resulted in a medical disability retirement from the City's police department. This was a pattern of discriminatory conduct against me that was calculated to punish me because of my medical disability retirement and to cause me emotional distress. This lawsuit was dismissed by Magistrate Judge Nathanael Cousins. He ruled that my lawsuit failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted, FRCP 12(b)(6). This ruling by Judge Cousins was a continuation of the flagrant bias and the lack of regard for facts and the rule of law by the courts in my lawsuits against the City of San Jose. Judge Cousins found that City officials had no duty to investigate my complaints against the City Attorney's Office based on his deliberate misinterpretation of a non-precedential case. Even though this ruling has no credibility based on commonsense alone, the case cited by Judge Cousins actually supports a finding that Mayor Liccardo and the City Council had a duty to investigate my complaints because they were the direct supervisors of City Attorney Richard Doyle and the City Attorney's Office. I appealed Judge Cousins ruling to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and it was affirmed without a hearing. A Rule 60 motion seeking relief from the judgment in my lawsuit was denied by Judge Cousins. An appeal of Judge Cousins' denial of my Rule 60 motion to the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals was also unsuccessful.
My Third Federal Lawsuit Against the City of San Jose, Chief of Police Rob Davis, Deputy Chief of Police Adonna Amoroso, and Captain Tuck Younis
Flagrant bias and retaliatory conduct by the district court was on full display!
As I noted from the beginning, the misconduct of San Jose city officials and the federal courts was mostly centered around the litigation of my first lawsuit. My second lawsuit which was just discussed resulted from City officials' refusal to investigate my misconduct complaints against the City Attorney's Office. The reason for bringing up the second lawsuit is to show the flagrant bias of the courts against me and to show their lack of respect for my constitutional rights, the rule of law, and precedent. It is important to understand that my third lawsuit, that will be discussed here, is directly linked to my first lawsuit which resulted in several criminal acts by San Jose city officials, and officials with the US District Court in San Jose and the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals. My third lawsuit is an independent action in equity for relief from the ill-begotten judgment in my first federal lawsuit that favors the City of San Jose. US District Judge Beth Labson Freeman is the presiding judge over my independent action in equity. As discussed earlier in this post, my earlier attempts to obtain relief from the illegitimate judgment was by way of Rule 60 motions pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure does not limit the power of a district court to entertain an independent action in equity for relief from judgment. An independent action in equity and a Rule 60 motion are similar in that they both seek to set aside a final judgment in a lawsuit. When appropriate, a Rule 60 motion can be heard as an independent action in equity and vice versa. They are different in that a Rule 60 motion calls for the court to exercise its supervisory powers over its judgments, whereas an independent action in equity calls for the court to exercise it equity powers. An independent action in equity is a new lawsuit or complaint. It is handled in the exact same manner as an original complaint/lawsuit. It allows a court to examine all of the issues in the original complaint without reference to any legal conclusion or assumption made by the prior court to hear the case.
The basis for relief in my independent action is essentially the same as the grounds for relief in my Rule 60 motions: fraud by the City and my attorney, bias by the courts in favor of the City, and the courts' misapplication of the collateral estoppel doctrine. As noted during the discussion of my first lawsuit, the City's motion for summary judgment pushed a false narrative that I was denied a CCW permit only one time by Deputy Chief Amoroso in April 2004 after she mistakenly believed that my work restriction to avoid psycho-emotional stress precluded me from carrying a concealed weapon. The City then made the false claim that Captain Tuck Younis reversed Amoroso's decision in August 2004 immediately after receiving a letter from the doctor providing my work restriction clarifying that it should not prevent me from carrying a concealed weapon. The truth is that Younis, as well as Chief of Police Rob Davis denied me a CCW permit, without a hearing required by state law, after both received the letter from the doctor explaining my work restriction. As noted in earlier discussions, the case that Younis and Davis violated my constitutionally protected right to the due process hearing required by law is airtight. The City Attorney's Office was well aware of this fact. In order to make their summary judgment motion viable, they entered a stipulation with my attorney to dismiss Younis from my lawsuit, falsely stating that I had authorized the stipulation of dismissal. In turn, Younis filed a declaration in support of the City's summary judgment motion falsely stating under oath that Davis played no role in the decisions to deny me a CCW permit, even though Davis received a letter from my attorney demanding that he issue me a CCW permit or face legal action. Davis failed to respond to the letter, even though it was his authority as Chief of Police to issue CCW permits. He had delegated that authority to Amoroso and Younis. The courts relied on the fraud-on-the-court by the City and ruled that Amoroso as an individual defendant was entitled to qualified immunity based on her false claim that she was confused about my work restriction but made no ruling on the actions of Younis and Davis that clearly violated my constitutional rights. The court treated the actions of Younis and Davis as if they never happened. The fraud-on-the-court by the City with the complicity of my attorney was successful in preventing the court from making an impartial ruling as to the actions of Amoroso, Younis, and Davis.
My basis for relief in my independent action in equity that the district court misapplied collateral estoppel or issue preclusion when dismissing my cause of action as to the City is indisputable. The district court dismissed my lawsuit based on a small claims court judgment from the State of California that the City won against me. The issue of collateral estoppel is discussed above, and as noted, I have brought it up in several motions and letters to the courts seeking relief from judgment. When determining the preclusive effect of a state court judgment, 28 USC Section 1738 (the full faith and credit act) requires federal courts to follow the preclusion law of the state where the judgment was rendered. Under California preclusion law, collateral estoppel or issue preclusion does not apply to judgments rendered in small claims courts because of the informal nature of small claims courts. Additionally, 9th Circuit Court of Appeals precedent, which applies to district courts in the 9th Circuit, states that the party asserting collateral estoppel as a defense must present a record that pinpoints what issue was litigated and determined in the prior proceeding. Even if the judgment the City won against me resulted from a formal proceeding, it still would not have collateral estoppel effect because there was no actual litigation, a requirement for collateral estoppel. 9th Circuit precedent also states that the courts consistently look to the record to see if an issue was actually litigated for purposes of applying collateral estoppel. There is no record from the small claims court that pinpoints what was litigated and determined in the case the City won against me. The City won the small claims case simply because the small claims commissioner dismissed my case for an apparent lack of jurisdiction without addressing any issues in my complaint. The district court's application of collateral estoppel in my first federal lawsuit is clearly erroneous.
As to my claim of bias as a basis for relief in my independent action in equity, I allege that the district court failed to enter summary judgment in my favor based on admissions by the City in its answer to my first lawsuit that defendants Amoroso, Younis, and Davis had each denied me a CCW permit without a hearing mandated by law. This was a clear violation of my constitutional rights. My bias claim is also based on the district court's fraud relative to the hearing on my Rule 60 motion for relief from judgment in my first federal lawsuit. Additionally, the district court refused to vacate the fraudulent stipulation of dismissal of defendant Tuck Younis because of its bias against me and favoritism for the City of San Jose.
Judge Beth Labson Freeman's ruling on my independent action in equity
Judge Freeman's ruling is the latest attempt by the courts to cover up the serious misconduct that occurred during the litigation of my first federal lawsuit against the City, Amoroso, Younis, and Davis. Judge Freeman dismissed my independent action in equity based on the law-of-the-case doctrine pursuant to a motion to dismiss by the City. Law-of-the-case is a preclusion doctrine just as res judicata. As discussed earlier, res judicata has to two aspects: claim preclusion, also called res judicata; and issue preclusion or collateral estoppel. Law-of-the-case directs a court's discretion, whereas res judicata is a mandatory doctrine. Even though law-of-the-case is a discretionary doctrine, courts rarely deviate from it for reasons of judicial economy and the need to prevent endless litigation. Law-of-the-case applies within the confines of the same case prior to a court entering a final judgment. Whereas res judicata applies once a final judgment has been entered. If a party in a lawsuit moves the court to settle an issue that comes up during litigation before the court has rendered its final judgment and the court's ruling on that issue is appealed, the appellate court's ruling becomes law of the case. The appellate court's ruling must be followed during litigation of the case until a final judgment is entered. That's how the law-of-the-case doctrine works. However, there are exceptions to the law of the case doctrine: 1. the final decision is clearly erroneous and enforcing it would work a manifest injustice; 2. intervening controlling authority makes reconsideration appropriate, or 3. substantially different evidence was cited at a subsequent trial.
In her order on my independent action in equity, Judge Freeman ruled that it was a continuation of my first federal lawsuit, essentially saying they were the same case. She then dismissed my independent action in equity finding that the issues I raised fall within the law-of-the-case doctrine. This is flat out wrong. As I noted above, my independent action in equity is linked to my first federal lawsuit in that it attempts to set aside the illegitimate judgment in my first federal lawsuit. Other than that, it is an original complaint and Judge Freeman was required to examine the issues I raised in my independent action in equity without reference to any legal conclusion or assumption made by the prior court that heard my first federal lawsuit. She did not do so because of her bias in favor of the City and her clear intent to cover up the misconduct of San Jose city officials and the courts. This fact was evident in the hearing on the City's motion to dismiss and declare me a vexatious litigant. Judge Freeman made it clear she was not interested in discussing the merits of the claims in my independent action in equity. She only wanted to hear from me as to why I should not be declared a vexatious and harassing litigant. But I insisted that the claims I made had merit much to her chagrin.
In addition to her order dismissing my independent action in equity based on the law-of-the-case doctrine, she issued an order, at the request of the City, declaring me to be a vexatious and harassing litigant. None of the requirements were met for me to be declared a vexatious and harassing litigant by precedent. First of all, my three federal lawsuits, motions and appeals over sixteen years was not an inordinate amount of litigation. And perhaps most importantly, the issues I raised in my independent action in equity (fraud, bias, and misapplication of the law by the courts) were not "wholly fanciful" or "patently without merit.," a requirement for a vexatious/harassing litigant declaration. As noted much earlier in this post, Judge William Fletcher stated during the appeals' hearing in my first federal lawsuit that he was dubious about collateral estoppel because there was no record of any litigation in my smalls claims case. The City also made claims in their answering brief during my appeal of Judge Freeman's ruling dismissing my independent action in equity and declaring me a vexatious and harassing litigant that collateral estoppel does not apply to small claims judgments under California preclusion law. So clearly on the issue of collateral estoppel my claim has merit. As to my claim of bias, no reasonable person will say that Judge Fletcher's comments during the hearing on my appeal in my first federal lawsuit asking why I was making this a federal case, and why didn't I just drop the "darn thing" is not flagrant bias against me.
It is unmistakable that Judge Freeman's order dismissing my independent action in equity and declaring me a vexatious and harassing litigant is clearly erroneous, as well as an abuse of discretion. The order's purpose is to hide the misconduct of the courts and the City of San Jose during litigation of my lawsuits. The order is also punitive and retaliatory and is intended to chill my speech protesting the reprehensible and criminal misconduct of the City, my attorney, and the courts. This implicates obstruction of justice and several other public corruption crimes. My appeal of judge Freeman's order is currently pending in the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals.
Summary
"They know better than that, they are messing with you"
As I noted in the introduction, the doctor that provided the work restriction at the center of this controversy said that City officials knew better and that they were messing with me when Deputy Chief Amoroso denied me a CCW permit based on the false claim that my work restriction to avoid psycho-emotional stress meant I retired on a psychological disability. The backstory of my lawsuits detailed in Post #73 proves this statement by the doctor to be true. However, as I said earlier, it was not Amoroso's conduct that was the impetus for my litigation. It was the actions of Captain Tuck Younis and Chief of Police Rob Davis that resulted in my lawsuits, because they received a letter from the doctor just mentioned that City officials said made it crystal clear that Amoroso's decision to deny me a CCW permit based on my work restriction was wrong. Yet, Younis and Davis refused to reverse Amoroso's decision and denied me a CCW permit anyway without a hearing mandated by state law. As noted above, the hearing requirement implicates a constitutionally protected interest according to U.S. District Court Judge Ronald M. Whyte. This is one of the most important facts in this case.
The misconduct, much of it criminal, that occurred during litigation of my first federal lawsuit, as described above, was primarily geared to covering up the actions of Younis and Davis, the courts' misapplication of the collateral estoppel doctrine, and the bias of the courts in favor of the City of San Jose. To cover up the actions of Younis and Davis, the City put forth the false narrative that my CCW permit was denied only one time by Amoroso and that I was granted a CCW permit four months later by Younis immediately after he received the letter from the doctor explaining my work restriction. The indisputable evidence and the City's own admissions in their answer to my first federal lawsuit proves that this is a blatant lie. To prevent the court from being able to do its lawful job of scrutinizing Younis' actions, the City and my attorney dismissed him from my lawsuit by way of a fraudulent stipulation of dismissal. After being dismissed from my lawsuit, Younis, at the urging of the City, committed perjury in a declaration in support of the City's motion for summary judgment by stating that Davis played no role in the denial and later granting of my CCW permit. This is another blatant lie by the City and is criminal obstruction of justice. The City, with complicity from my attorney, made more blatantly false claims relative to its motion for summary judgment and during my appeal of the district court's order granting the City's motion for summary judgment. As to the issue of collateral estoppel, the small claims judgment relied upon has no preclusive effect, no if, ands, or buts. Refer to the above discussion for details. As to the bias and fraud of the courts, district court personnel deliberately misstated in court docket entries that my Rule 60 motion seeking to overturn the judgment on the City's motion for summary judgment was regarding "Costs Taxed," knowing fully that it was regarding fraud by the City and my attorney, the courts' misapplication of collateral estoppel, and the courts' bias against me. After misstating the grounds for my motion, the district court held a phony hearing on my Rule 60 motion with a contradicting transcript and civil minutes. Judgment was then entered in favor of the City. The most compelling evidence of bias, however, is the comments of Judge William Fletcher during the hearing on my appeal of the district court's order granting the City's summary judgment motion. He said there is an old cliche, why did he make this a federal case? and why didn't he just drop the darn thing? This blatant lack of impartiality alone makes the ruling against me in my appeal and to the case as a whole unconstitutional. Refer to the above discussion for more details.
Conclusion
The courts acted if they were the legal counsel for the City
The actions of San Jose city officials in denying me a CCW permit was malicious, punitive, retaliatory; and was calculated to demean me, make me feel powerless, cause me financial harm, and to inflict extreme emotion distress. Their actions were also discriminatory because of my race and medical disability. I am black/ African American. Remember what the doctor said, they know better than that, they are messing with you!
The egregious conduct of the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, the US District Court, my attorney Stuart Kirchick, and San Jose city officials during the litigation of my federal lawsuits violates statutory law, the Constitution, and precedent. But I have to say the actions of my attorney takes the cake when it comes to these corrupt and disgusting officials. He chose to deliberately sabotage my case by stipulating to the dismissal of defendant Younis whose actions clearly violated my constitutional rights. The sole purpose of the dismissal of Younis was to prevent the courts from making a ruling on his unlawful conduct. Kirchick then refused to challenge the false declaration of Younis declaring that defendant Davis played no role in the decision-making regarding the denial and later granting of my CCW permit. My attorney's actions were done with the specific intent to help the City prevail against me. Nothing is more reprehensible than an attorney scheming against his very own client in order that his client's loses his lawsuit. Truly disgusting!
What separates this fraud-on-the-court and public corruption case from most other cases of misconduct by court officials and attorneys, who are officers of the court, is the extent of the fraud and criminal acts these officials were willing to commit in order to cover up their misconduct. Totally shocking!
The first thing that should happen here is that the judgments in each of my three federal lawsuits should be overturned because they are tainted by fraud and bias against me. The courts did not bother to give even the slightest appearance of impartiality when ruling against me during the litigation of my lawsuits. They acted as if they were the legal counsel for the City. The next thing that should happen is that an investigation should be initiated into the misconduct that occurred during the litigation of my lawsuits, and those found guilty of misconduct should be held accountable. The evidence of misconduct is indisputable and overwhelming. The links below provide additional details about my cases:
