The Corollary to Military Members Right to Refuse Unlawful Orders is Litigants Right to Refuse Unlawful Orders and Judgments by Federal Judges

April 21, 2026 - By Fred Bates

Here's something for the courts to think about

    In November 2025, six Democratic Members of Congress (Senators Elissa Slotkin and Mark Kelly; Representatives Chris Deluzio, Maggie Goodlander, Chrissy Houlahan, and Jason Crow) all with backgrounds in the military or national security released a video urging members of the military to refuse unlawful orders. In their message, the lawmakers stressed that military members' oath is to the Constitution and not to any leader, namely President Donald J. Trump. The six lawmakers stated that military members have a duty and obligation to refuse unlawful orders and that they must refuse unlawful orders. However, the six lawmakers did not identify a single order from President Trump to the military that they believed was unlawful because it violated the Constitution or any statutory law passed by Congress. The lawmakers' message to military members is technically correct but lacks sufficient guidance on how to determine what is an unlawful order from one that is controversial, but otherwise lawful. This was clearly a partisan stunt, but it brings up an important corollary. Do litigants in federal court have the same right to refuse patently unlawful orders and judgments by judges? The answer is a resounding YES! I bring up this question because of a situation I am dealing with based on a racial and disability discrimination lawsuit I filed against the City of San Jose in 2006 in the US District Court in San Jose.

    In their rulings in my lawsuit, judges in the US District Court and the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals knowingly and intentionally violated the Constitution, federal statutory law, the precedent of the US Supreme Court and the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals when dismissing my lawsuit based on collateral estoppel, also known as issue preclusion. The City of San Jose claimed a defense of collateral estoppel as to my claim against the City based on a judgment the City won against me in small claims court in California. Collateral estoppel is commonly referred to as issue preclusion. It means that an issue actually litigated and decided in a prior lawsuit cannot be litigated in a subsequent lawsuit. But there are rules that federal courts must follow when applying collateral estoppel or issue preclusion to judgments rendered in a state court. Federal courts must follow the preclusion law of the state that rendered the judgment. This requirement is mandated by the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution that is implemented by the full faith and credit act passed by Congress, 28 USC Section 1738. There is also Supreme Court precedent and Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' precedent that apply in my lawsuit against the City of San Jose that further invalidates the judgments of the courts' dismissal of my lawsuit on the basis of collateral estoppel or issue preclusion. Supreme Court precedent states that 28 USC Section 1738 is a command by Congress to federal courts to give the same preclusive effect to a state court judgment as would the courts in the state where the judgment was rendered. Ninth Court of Appeals' precedent states the burden is on the party [the City of San Jose] asserting collateral estoppel to produce a record that pinpoints what was litigated and decide in the state court; and that if there is no record that pinpoints what was litigated and decided, the court will not consider collateral estoppel on appeal. 

    In the small claims case that the City won against me, there was no actual litigation and the City presented no record that pinpoints what was litigated and decided in the small claims court. For these two reasons alone, the City's collateral defense has no merit, not only under California preclusion law, but under federal preclusion law as well. Another, perhaps more important reason that the City's collateral estoppel defense has no merit is that under California's preclusion law judgments rendered in small claims court are not given collateral estoppel or preclusive effect because of the informal nature of small claims proceedings. Therefore, federal courts cannot give preclusive effect to judgments rendered in small claims courts in California for this reason as well. It is unmistakable that the judgments of the federal courts dismissing my lawsuit against the City of San Jose violates the Constitution, federal statute 28 USC Section 1738, precedent of Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The judgments are not only unlawful but are not enforceable. Yet, the courts refuse to vacate the clearly erroneous and unlawful judgments in my lawsuit against the City. This is an abuse of power and obstruction of justice. 

    The corollary to Members of Congress' proclamation that military members have a duty and obligation to refuse unlawful orders and that they must refuse unlawful orders is that I have the same duty and obligation to refuse the unlawful judgments and orders of the courts in my lawsuit against the City of San Jose. Not only do I refuse the unlawful judgments and orders of the courts, but I also reject them in their entirety.  Long before the six Members of Congress issued their proclamation to military members declaring that they are obligated to refuse unlawful orders and that they must refuse unlawful orders, I wrote a letter to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in November 2015 stating that I would not obey its unlawful mandate in my lawsuit against the City of San Jose. So far, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court refuse to vacate the unlawful judgments. So, this brings up the problem of how do you force a federal court to reverse or vacate a judgment that is clearly unlawful when it refuses to do so? At some point is force and violence justified? Something for the courts to think about. Below are links to posts pertaining to the letter I sent to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and a link to a complaint report I submitted to the Supreme Court and Congress:

A Cheating Scandal in the Silicon Valley - Justice for Sale: Letter to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

A Cheating Scandal in the Silicon Valley - Justice for Sale: MESSAGE TO THE 9TH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS - I WILL NOT COMPLY WITH YOUR MANDATE!

https://corruptioninourfederalcourts.com/

Message to the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals: I WILL DIE ON THIS HILL!

Letter to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

Post 6/23

In my last post on October 19, I stated that there would be a constitutional crisis if the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals did not reverse its ruling relative to my appeal. I also stated that the court's ruling was void and I had no intention of complying with it as it currently stands. Today I am posting a letter I sent to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Clerk of Court Molly Dwyer and the Panel that heard my appeal. My purpose for the letter is to make it clear to the court and the City of San Jose that I will not be bullied into relinquishing my rights.

              

Frederick Bates

Folsom, CA 95630

(408) 510-

                                                                                                           

October 15, 2015

Molly Dwyer, Clerk of Court

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Post Office Box 193939

San Francisco, CA 94119-3939

Re: Frederick Bates – Appellant v. City of San Jose; et al – Appellees; No. 13-16397 and D.C. No. 5:06-cv-05302-RMW

To Clerk of Court Molly Dwyer and the Panel hearing my appeal (Canby, Bea, and Murguia, Circuit Judges):

On August 14, 2015, I filed a petition for panel rehearing. My petition argues that the ruling of this court on my appeal is a void judgment because it relies on the written order of the district court purported to be on the merits. As I argued in my petition, the district court’s written order is void because the court had already granted the City a default judgment by way of their dispositive “motion to dismiss” in the hearing on April 26, 2013, because I failed to appear. The default judgment divested the district court of jurisdiction to enter its written order. The district court made an apparent attempt to reconcile the contradiction in its judgment from the bench and its written order in a letter in October 2013, months after this court had already acquired jurisdiction. Therefore, the district court lacked jurisdiction to amend or modify its judgment. For this reason, the letter of the district court does not change the default judgment it entered during the hearing. The written order is a nullity. The judgment of this court is void as well because it affirms the written order of the district court. There can be no credible argument made in opposition to this fact.

The purpose of this letter is not to reargue my petition, but to strongly encourage this court to immediately grant my request for a rehearing and reverse the decision affirming the void judgment of the district court based on its written order. The order of this court is nothing more than an attempt to give legitimacy to the district court’s ruling that granted the City’s motion for summary judgment. Unfortunately, this draws attention away from the merits of this case and the clear and convincing evidence of fraud perpetrated by district court officials and the City relative to the hearing on my motion for relief from judgment. My fraud claims are addressed in my motion to vacate judgment dated September 23, 2014.

The judgment of the district court granting the City’s summary judgment motion will never gain legitimacy and will always be void and unenforceable under the law; because the district court failed to follow the mandate of Article IV, Section 1of the United States Constitution (Full Faith and Credit Clause). Article IV, Section 1 is implemented by 28 USC, Section 1738 (Full Faith and Credit Act). The Full Faith and Credit Act command federal courts

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to follow the preclusion law of the state from which a judgment is taken. Federal courts have no discretion at all when it comes to applying preclusion rules to state court judgments. This has been settled law from nearly the beginning of our republic. It is unarguable that the district court failed to follow the preclusion law of California and employed its own rules when it granted preclusive effect to the small claims judgment at issue. California courts will not grant preclusive effect to the small claims judgment because there was no actual litigation or a determination of the issue I raised in my complaint. Furthermore, there is no record at all of what transpired in the small claims hearing.

In affirming the written order of the district court, this court opined that the district court properly determined that I was not entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(4) because the district court’s “prior” judgment was not void due to jurisdictional error or a violation of due process. The Supreme Court’s ruling in the Espinosa case was cited as the authority. The Espinosa case establishes that Rule 60(b)(4) applies only in the rare instance where a judgment is premised either on a certain type of jurisdictional error or on a violation of due process that deprives a party of notice or the opportunity to be heard. My motion for relief under Rule 60(b)(4) does not conflict with the Espinosa case. I argued in my motion that the district court’s “prior” judgment is void under Rule 60(b)(4) because it gives preclusive effect to the small claims judgment that is constitutionally infirm. The small claims judgment is constitutionally infirm because I was deprived of the opportunity to be heard during the hearing in small claims court. Therefore, the order of the district court that gives preclusive effect to the small claims judgment is void for the same reason. It is reasonable to conclude that my motion is appropriate under Rule 60(b)(4). This argument, however, is not meant to change in any way my position that the default judgment of the district court based on the motion to dismiss it granted to the City is the only judgment that this court can legitimately base its ruling. I maintain that the written order of the district court is a nullity and the judgment of this court affirming the written order is a nullity as well. Furthermore, there is no procedural bar to providing me relief from the void judgment of the district court as the ruling of this court seems to imply. As stated in my petition, my motion for relief would also have been appropriate in an independent action; or the courts could have provided me relief sua sponte.

Again, I encourage this court to grant my petition for a panel rehearing and reverse its ruling on my appeal. A failure to do so will result in a constitutional crisis because, as noted above, it is indisputable that the ruling of this court as it currently stands is in violation of Article IV, Section 1 of the United States Constitution (Full Faith and Credit Clause) which is implemented by 28 USC, Section 1738 (Full Faith and Credit Act). Therefore, the current ruling of this court that precludes my lawsuit against the City of San Jose on the basis of collateral estoppel is a void judgment. It is unenforceable just as all of the other judgments that preclude my lawsuit on the basis of collateral estoppel. It is inconceivable that the courts would apply collateral estoppel in this case when there is no record of what transpired in the small claims hearing. Both the district court and this court have simply used creativity and wishful thinking in applying collateral estoppel. Simply put, if there is no record, collateral estoppel cannot apply.

Additionally, I argued in my petition, and on appeal, that the stipulation of dismissal of Defendant Tuck Younis is also void because it was entered without my consent, I received no benefit from it, and it impaired my cause of action. The actions of my attorney and the City in

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dismissing Younis without my authorization deprived me of an absolute right. My motion for relief from the stipulation of dismissal is also proper under Rule 60(b)(4) because I was deprived of the opportunity to be heard on my cause of action as to Defendant Younis. The stipulation of dismissal was not addressed by this court.

A failure of this court to reverse itself all but ensures that litigation will not end, because the current ruling of this court is void by law and I am under no obligation to comply with it. I will not be bullied by the courts or the City into relinquishing my rights in this matter. This means that more judicial resources will be wasted; and it will also create a very uncomfortable situation. I appeal to the conscience of the court to provide me the relief I am due by law; because relief from a void judgment is not discretionary, it is mandatory.

                                                                                                Sincerely,

                                                                                                Frederick Bates